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JOHN MARSHALL, MAGNIFICENT MUGWUMP
by
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE*
The tendency of all of us is to catalogue every one as either liberal or con-
servative. No truer song has ever been sung than the one Private Willis sings as
the curtain rises for the second act of Iolanthe.1 Following this passion for classi-
fication, there are those who classify John Marshall as the arch-conservative of all
time.2 But speaking personally, if one must do this, John Marshall should be
called America's first and most magnificent "Mugwump".3 In this he does not
differ from those Americans who vote every year for the best man, regardless of
party label.
There are three periods of Marshall's life that put an indelible stamp on his
character. First, Marshall grew up on the frontier, in the backwoods of Virginia,
not on a prosperous plantation in the Tidewater. Although he was the eldest of
fifteen children, his mother and father had time to instruct him, with occasional
*Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
11 often think it's comical-
Fal, lal, la!
How Nature always does contrive-
That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little liberal
Or else a little Conservative!
-Private Willis at the opening of the second
act of Gilbert and Sullivan's lolanthe.
2 RODELL, NINE MEN (1955); and see the essay of Max Lerner in 20 COL. L. REv.
396 (1939), reprinted in Surrency, John Marshall and the Campaign of History in THE
MARSHALL READER (Oceana 1955).
a "Mugwump" is a phrase of Indian origin that came into our language in the famous
campaign of 1884 between Blaine and Cleveland. Also that was the year of "Rum, Roman-
ism and Rebellion". According to "A Dictionary of Americanisms on Historical Principles"
(1951) a "Mugwump" was an independent Republican who voted for Cleveland in 1884
as a "mugwumpian Democrat". In the slang of the time he had his "mug" one one side of
the fence and his "wump" on the other. "The Encyclopedia Americana" [Vol. 19, 548
(1955)] says of "Mugwump": The word belongs to the Algonquin dialect of the Indian
language and is used by John Eliot in his translation of the Bible to translate the Hebrew
word "Alluph", a leader. Eliot used it in the sense of a Big Chief, a term more compre-
hensible to the Indian mind than that which appears in the King James version . . . that
means Duke. The word was spelled "mugqump" in the singular and "mugquompaog" in
the plural. It appears many places throughout the Algonquin translation of the Old
Testament.
help from the family's minister. His father was a member of the House of Burgesses
which met in Colonial Williamsburg, and with George Washington was part of
the block of backwoodsmen's votes that carried Henry's motions to protest the
stamp tax over the opposition of the tidewater planter. There are those who might
believe that living in backwoods Virginia in 1765 and having your father come
home and regale you with the debates and the gossip at Williamsburg was educa-
tion of a high order. It is a history course we could all wish to elect.
Secondly, at an early age John Marshall marched off with his father to fight
with Washington.4 His biographer, Beveridge,- declares that the winter at Valley
Forge was a better education for Marshall than Oxford or Cambridge. We can
believe it. The war was almost lost. The states and the weak Continental Congress
would not give Washington supplies or troops. Jefferson, then a wealthy man, was
at Monticello, busy being Governor of Virginia and framing laws for the reform
of the state government and the protection of civil liberty. Jefferson, although
warned by Washington, neglected even to turn out the Virginia militia to prevent
Arnold's burning of Richmond. Valley Forge for Marshall was an advance seminar
on the need America has for a strong central government.
Third, when Marshall was a member of the Virginia Legislature after the
war, he became disgusted with the provincial attitude of the states. The votes
which prevented the payment of British debts promised in the peace treaty, which
defeated efforts to extradite criminals and made the day by day conduct of business
so difficult, made Marshall believe he was back at Valley Forge. He took his Ph.D.
in National Government at Richmond as a state legislator. Jefferson as a philoso-
pher in far-off Paris could rejoice in Shay's Rebellion as evidence of American
freedom but to Marshall it was anarchy that would make stable government
impossible."
These three periods of his life made a profound impression on Marshall. It
made him feel that the rabble could not be trusted to establish in this country a
stable, reliable national government. Remembering Valley Forge and the experi-
ence of the states under the Articles of Confederation, who can blame Marshall for
feeling this way at that time?
It is true, of course, that, after the comparative poverty of his early youth,
Marshall became a successful lawyer while he was serving in the legislature and
4 He was a Lieutenant in the Third Virginia regiment of which his father was aMajor and fought at Iron Hill, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth and Stony Point. He
wintered at Valley Forge. When Arnold invaded Virginia Marshall returned to service
and fought to the close of the war. Mr. Justice Burton, John Marshall-The Man, 104
U. OF PA. L. REV. 3 (1955). See 1 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 69-147
(1919).
51 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 108-147 (1919).
6ld. at 200-400.
adopted in some measure the conservative views of his properous Richmond
clients. Virginia then was larger and more important than New York or any other
colony. Also, from his days in Fairfax County he counted Washington his greatest
hero.
Something should be said of Marshall as a man. Beveridge would have us
believe that Marshall was consistently unkempt and slovenly in his dress. Neverthe-
less, when he came to visit at Yorktown after the war, the Ambler girls looked
forward to meeting him. Mary Ambler announced in advance that she intended
to marry him. The other sisters took one look at this awkward frontiersman and
left him to Mary, who married him as she had said she would.7 His genuine love
for his wife was perhaps Marshall's finest trait. With it apparently went a very
chivalrous attitude of respect and consideration for all women. It was after the
death of his wife in 1831 that Marshall was said to have had his saddest days.8
His personality was so attractive that it accounts in large measure for the
fact that Justice Burton can observe that some 23 of the 62 constitutional cases in
which Marshall participated were unanimous.' Living as the Justices did at one
boarding house in Washington, there was ample time for them to talk over their
cases. And as a conversationalist Marshall was the best. The "Marshall Court"
was rightly named. Sitting from 1801 to 1835, Marshall served with some fifteen
associate Justices of whom seven, Thompson, Livingston, Todd, Story, Duvall,
Washington and Johnson were with him for many years-Johnson for thirty.
Justice Burton tells us "there has been no other period of comparable continuity,
none when continuity was so essential."10
Apparently, Marshall sat on 135 cases involving international law and wrote
the Court's opinion in 80." This indicates he was persuasive with his judicial
brethren in controversies not only about domestic but also foreign law.
It must have been his homespun appearance and friendly manner that caused
so many to love and admire John Marshall. Beveridge says that only Spencer
7 Id. at 108-147. As part of falling in love with Mary Ambler, Marshall walked to
Philadelphia for a smallpox innoculation. He made 35 miles a day but arrived so dis-
reputable looking that the tavern would not take him in. He suffered no ill effects and
returned home to wed Mary.
84 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 518-595 (1919).
9 Mr. Justice Burton, John Marshall-The Man, 104 U. OF PA. L. REV. 3 (1955).
"Ibid. During Marshall's days, the Supreme Court occupied a court room in the
basement of the Capitol, quarters which in 1956 were used by the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee. From 1860 to 1935 the Supreme Court sat in the little court room on the
Senate floor of the Capitol opposite the Senate Disbursing Room. In this room there are
busts of the Chief Justices, starting with John Jay and ending with William Howard Taft.
Dean Acheson, at the American Law Institute banquet in Washington in May, 1956 spoke
of how comfortable this old room was, contrasting its intimacy with the marble mausoleum
that the Cass Gilberts, father and son, built for the Court atop Capitol Hill.
11 Dumbauld, John Marshall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. OF PA. L. REV. 38 (1955).
Roane, the Judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals, and Thomas Jefferson hated
Marshall personally.12 This is the more remarkable in a period when public issues
were so frequently made bitter personal ones. But Marshall at home did his own
marketing and en route to his house talked to the humblest in Richmond. Once
Bishop Meade of Richmond met Marshall astride his horse, holding on the pommel
a jug of whiskey. The cork had come out and Marshall was using his thumb as a
stopper."
His sense of humor was acute. Once a young lawyer flattered him by saying
the Chief Justice had "reached the acme of judicial distinction" and Marshall
answered:
The acme of judicial distinction means the ability to look a lawyer straight
in the eyes for two hours and not hear a damned word he says.
14
Marshall once visited a club in Philadelphia where it was the rule that every
member make a rhyme. Two or three Kentucky colonels were drinking bourbon at
a table nearby. The word given Marshall was "paradox". His rhyme went this way:
In the Blue Grass Region
A paradox was born
The corn was full of kernels
And the colonels full of corn. 15
While on circuit at Raleigh, Marshall would stay at a tavern kept by one
Cooke, carry his own wood to his room and pitch quoits in the street with the
public characters at the tavern.
Once Marshall drove over a sapling that became wedged between the wheel
and the shaft. A negro servant of his friend Nathaniel Macon helped him. Marshall
asked the boy to remember him to Macon. When he did so, Macon began to
extol Marshall as the great Chief Justice. The lad answered:
Marse Nat, he may be de bigges' lawyer in de United States, but he ain't got
sense enough to back a gig off a saplin. 16
Quite aptly, Professor Frederick L. Bronner of Union College recently remarked
that Marshall's catholic tastes, which included whist, backgammon, horse races
12 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 78.
13 Id. at 63.
14Id. at 82-83.
15 Id. at 83.
"I Id. at 64-65. This story has special appeal to me. My mother opposed my entry to
the Cornell Law School in much the same way. As a young man the Dean had lost a horse
case for her. How could the law school be any good when the Dean caused her to have to
pay for a horse so sick that he was found dead in the barn on the day of delivery? Another
favorite Marshall story is the one about Court's custom of having a drink of wine on a
rainy day. One sunny day Marshall asked Story to look out the window to see if he could
catch a glimpse of rain. When Story reported none, Marshall overruled him on the ground
that somewhere in the thirteen or more states over which the Court then had jurisdiction
it must be raining. The present Attorney General of the United States in a recent piece
recalls this familiar yarn. Brownell, John Marshall, The Chief Justice, 41 CORNELL L. Q.
93 (1955).
and "liberal purchases of wines and drinkables and fees to the Masons and the
Jockie Club" must mean that "one doesn't have to be solemn, staid and serious
to be a lawyer, a judge or a great man."
' 17
Princeton, Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania gave Marshall hon-
orary degrees. 8 But except for six weeks at William and Mary, where he studied
law under the great George Wythe,11 Marshall had no formal education.2" He
had hardly arrived at William and Mary when he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa,
and even became a member of the Debating Team.2' Drinking was prohibited
except for "beer, cider, toddy or spirits and water" when Marshall attended. Twelve
years later the exception was changed to read "except in that moderation which
becomes the prudent and industrious student." 
22
It is quite appropriate that John Marshall's memory has been kept alive in a
unique manner. When Marshall died on July 6, 1835, the Philadelphia bar
collected about $3,000, although the contributions were limited to $10 each. Rich-
mond lawyers gave the most. The Philadelphia lawyers so wisely invested the
moneys that by 1884 it was $20,000. Congress put up $20,000 more and com-
missioned William Wetmore Story, the son of Mr. Justice Story, to make a statue
of Marshall. Story's statue represents Marshall sitting in his robes and chair on
the west lawn of the Capitol, facing the mall, that lovely strip of green grass that
extends over fourteen long blocks to Washington's Monument. How fitting that
Marshall should sit looking at this grand view up to the Monument for the
Washington he adored! 21
The statue of Marshall was unveiled on May 10, 1884 with a speech by Chief
Justice Morrison R. Waite of the Supreme Court of the United States and an
oration by William Henry Rawle, Esq. of the Philadelphia bar. Dr. J. G. Armstrong
of the Monumental Church of Richmond, Virginia, said the blessing, and Senator
John Sherman of Ohio headed a joint Congressional Committee.24 In 1901, one
hundred years after Marshall ascended the bench, celebrations were held in his
17 20 ALBANY L. REV. 4 (1956).
18 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 89.
Vo I BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 154.
2fId. at 157-158.
21Id at 158-159.
221d. at 156, see footnote.
23 William Wetmore Story was born February 12, 1819 and died October 7, 1895. He
took an A.B. and an LL.B. at Harvard and he practiced law in Boston with Hillard, Sumner
and George Ticknor Curtis. He was a poet, sculptor and musician. Also he was a Bank-
ruptcy Commissioner and a Court Commissioner in the United States Courts in Massachusetts,
Maine and Pennsylvania. See NATIONAL DICTIONARY o BIOGRAPHY.
24 I am indebted to Associate Justice Francis Bergan of, the Appellate Division, Third
Department of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, for the citation, 112 U.S. 744,
memory from coast to coast.25 September, 1955 was the two-hundredth anniver-
sary of his birth and once again, in memory of him, men and women gathered
from coast to coast to speak about him."' It is a great and lasting tribute to John
Marshall that the American people remember him in this way.
Marshall's personal qualities and his days in the backwoods when his father
fought against the King at Williamsburg, his days in battle with Washington and
during the long winter at Valley Forge,27 and his days as a legislator, battling for
the Constitution, a stable government and the keeping of our treaty obligations,
unquestionably played a great part in what most scholars regard as his three great-
est decisions, namely, Marbury v. Madison,2s McCullough v. Maryland,29 and
Gibbons v. Ogden.s0
Marbury v. Madison was not really a decision. It was a lecture on morals to
Jefferson, the great moralist, who needed it badly. William Marbury had been
appointed a Justice of the Peace in Alexandria which was then part of the District
of Columbia. Marshall had been Secretary of State under John Adams and one
of the last acts of the Adams administration was to appoint a great number of
Justices of the Peace, of whom Marbury was one. Marshall left the Commission of
Marbury at his office, which Madison inherited as Secretary of State for Jefferson."'
Marbury sued directly in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to be
directed to Madison to give him his commission as Justice of the Peace.
which gives a description of this dedication. The statue is signed "W.W.Story, Roma, 1883."
Justice Burton speaks feelingly of this Marshall statue in his article in the Pennsylvania Law
Review [104 U. OF PA. L. REv. 3-8 (1955] and in the little book that the University of
Michigan published in 1937, "An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall", there is an
interesting picture of it.
25 Francis Miles Finch, then Dean of Cornell Law School, gave the principal address
at Yale; Cornelius H. Hanford and Charles E. Sheppard gave addresses in Seattle, Washing-
ton; Judge Charles H. Simonton spoke in South Carolina before its legislature and highest
court on February 4, 1901; Chief Justice John H. Shanck of the Ohio Supreme Court spoke
at Columbus, Ohio; and Wayne Mac Veagh, Esq. spoke before the House of Representatives
on behalf of the American Bar Association. The library of the Supreme Court of the
United States has a collection of these speeches.
26 In 1955 by far the most outstanding meeting was held at Harvard Law School on
September 22, 23 and 24. One of many fine addresses at the Harvard meeting was by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter. See 69 HARv. L. Rav. 217-238 (1955). The most extensive
celebration for the Marshall Bi-Centennial year was at William and Mary in Williamsburg,
Virginia. On September 25, 1954, busts of Marshall, Wythe and Blackstone by Felix W.
deWeldon were unveiled there by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Lord Chief
Justice of England. The addresses which were delivered at the ceremonies are collected in
a small volume published by the Cornell University Press in 1956.
27 Marshall seems to have been as popular in the Army as elsewhere. He was nicknamed
"Silver Heels" because of the white yarn that his mother had knitted into the heels of the
woolen stockings in which he won many foot races. Mr. Justice Burton, op. cit. supra note 9.
21 Cranch 137 (1803).
294 Wheat. 316 (1819).
Suing in this manner, directly in the Supreme Court in the first instance,
Marbury acted in accordance with the 13th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
In 1794 under the same section the Court had issued a writ of mandamus to
Henry Knox, Washington's Secretary of War.12 The Constitution in Article III
gives the Supreme Court the right to hear directly cases involving states and
ambassadors. But Article III goes on to say that in other cases the Supreme Court
shall sit only as an appellate court "with such Exceptions and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make".
The 13th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 made an "exception" for writs
of mandamus and habeas corpus. The ultimate decision of Marshall was that it was
unconstitutional for the Congress to make this exception even though the Consti-
tution clearly authorizes the Congress so to do.'3 Thus the explanation for Marbury
30 9 Wheat 1 (1824).
313 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 101-156 (1919).
S2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1008-1048 (1953). See especially subdivision 6 which discusses Chandler v. Knox
and another such case. Both are unreported but were mentioned in the argument and in the
opinion in Marbury v. Madison. Marshall said: "If Congress remains at liberty (under
Article III] of the Constitution to give [the supreme] court appellate jurisdiction, where
the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction
where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made
in the constitution under Articles III is form without substance." And Marshall went on to
say: "Affirmative words [the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction] are often, in
their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; [for instance, that Article III
meant that in only the cases specifically mentioned could the Court have original jurisdiction]
and [in the provision foregoing], a negative or exclusive sense must be given [its affirma-
tive words], or they have no operation at all." Crosskey comments that "the ordinary
eighteenth-century rule" was as Marshall stated with respect to a negative "outside their
affirmative scope", but he says this "was not the situation with respect to the provision of
Article III [that Marshall] quoted," "For the provision would manifestly still have secured
to the Court its original jurisdiction as therein provided, whether that jurisdiction could be
added to or not." Quite rightly, it seems to me Crosskey contends that Article III contem-
plated that the Congress would diminish or increase the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
court within the classes of cases to which the affirmative grant with its negative implication
gave the Court power to hear. Therefore, "the only legitimate question in Marbury v.
Madison was whether Congress had made such an exception, by section 13, in a constitutional
manner." As Crosskey says, the answer was clearly in the affirmative as a matter of law.
"For adding, to the Court's original jurisdiction, cases such as the Marbury case-which
otherwise would have been within its constitutionally conferred appellate jurisdiction-was
undeniably one way of making exceptions from the latter jurisdiction; and way, moreover,
that complied fully with the condition, to which Congress's excepting power is properly
subject by the [affirmative and negative] terms of Article III.
33 Crosskey suggests this. Id. at 1041. The research of Crosskey as to the use of the
limited affirmative in the eighteenth century [1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in
the History of the United States 486-487] and his analysis of Marshall's reasoning [2 CROSS-
KBY op. cit. supra note 32 at 1041-1042] convinces me that Marbury v. Madison was
technically decided extra-legally. As Crosskey says, the nub of the decision legally was
whether the exception clause in Article III should have been read this way: "In all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsuls, and those to which a State shall
be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, [and that] in all the other
v. Madison lies in the history of the time. The law was clear that the statute was
constitutional.
34
Professional detractors of Marshall contend that he wanted to destroy Congress
and protect the rich. Far from it. Jefferson, like Roosevelt in our time, was out
to destroy the Supreme Court, to impeach Marshall and appoint Spencer Roane
of Virginia in Marshall's post. There is conclusive historical evidence that Jefferson
wanted to get rid of the Federalist judges who had been jailing newspaper editors
who dared to write articles derogatory of John Adams. In this we can sympathize
with Jefferson. No one should go to jail for writing an honest criticism of John
Adams or Eisenhower or any other American President. But neither should federal
judges be thrown out of office when a new President and political party come
into power.85
If Marshall had decided Marbury v. Madison as he legally should have, Jeffer-
son would have had the ammunition he wanted to impeach not only Marshall
but every other Federalist judge. If Marshall had decided that Marbury was im-
properly appointed, the Federalist party and Marshall himself would have become
a laughing stock. Marshall's actual decision allowed him to say that Marbury had
a legal and moral right to his commission, that in denying him a commission
Madison and Jefferson were violating the laws of the land, but that unfortunately
the Supreme Court could not interfere because the statute the Congress had passed,
permitting Marbury to sue in the Supreme Court in the first instance, was uncon-
stitutional.
The political aspect of Marbury v. Madison is evident from two other facts. If
the only trouble were the lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear
Marbury on a direct application, why did not Marbury start all over in the Circuit
Court and, if he lost, appeal from the Circuit to the Supreme Court? And the
so-called sixteen mid-night judges who were duly appointed by John Adams
under the Judiciary Act of 1801 and entitled under Article III of the Constitution
to "hold their offices during good behavior", 6 were unconstitutionally deprived of
cases [enumerated in Article 111] it shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and
fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Or
should it be read the way Marshall read it? My vote is for Crosskey and in accordance with
the two prior decisions of the Court.
34 See the comments of the late Thomas Reed Powell at the William and Mary Law
School on the Anniversary of Marbury v. Madison. See 2 WILLIAM AND MARY L. REV. at
page 24 (1955).
35 3 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 100-222 (1919). See also 2 CROSSKEY
op. cit. supra note 32 at 1008-1048.
36 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 611 (1953).
their jobs by Jefferson when the Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed. To his dying
day Marshall believed that Jefferson acted unconstitutionally in refusing to allow
these judges to serve. Yet no mandamus suit was ever brought by any of these
sixteen judges to force Madison and Jefferson to allow them to serve! Like the
decision in Marbury v. Madison, the failure of both Marbury and the sixteen mid-
night judges to apply to a Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus means that it was
politically inexpedient to do so, because it might have given Jefferson added
ammunition with which to press for the removal of Marshall and the other Feder-
alist judges on the Supreme and Circuit Courts.
Not only is it clear that Marbury v. Madison was incorrectly decided on the
law, but it is questionable whether Marshall ever intended that the power should
be exercised against the Congress as we have seen the Supreme Court do in our
generation. It was not until the Dred Scott Case in 1857 that the Supreme Court
ever again declared a law of the Congress unconstitutional. And the wording of
the Supremacy Clause of Constitution in Article VI leads one to believe that with
respect to acts of Congress and treaties the Supreme Court may lack the same
power that it has to declare state laws unconstitutional. If a law be passed by the
Congress pursuant to an enumerated power, and that law does not expressly violate
another provision of the Constitution, generally speaking the Supreme Court no
longer declares it unconstitutional. Nor should it. It is the power to declare laws
of states unconstitutional that is so essential for the preservation of a strong central
government.
That power Marshall asserted in McCulloch v. Maryland, perhaps his greatest
opinion. There Marshall declared that the national government is "a government of
the people"-that it "emanates from them" and "Its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." Webster para-
phrased this language of Marshall in his reply to Hayne, and Lincoln at Gettysburg
paraphrased both. 7 In retrospect one wonders why Marshall ever decided either
Marbury v. Madison or McCulloch v. Maryland.
Marshall's position in Marbury v. Madison, where he had himself mislaid
Marbury's commission, would disqualify present-day judges. Decision of the
appeal in the Alcoa anti-trust case was delayed a long time because so many former
Attorneys General were on the Court that it could not muster a quorum, to decide
the case. Finally the Congress passed a special law creating a court to hear the
appeal. 88
37 4 BEvERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 8 at 282-339.
3s U. S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (1950).
McCulloch v. Maryland could have been limited to a decision that a tax
levied only on a national bank was discriminatory. Both cases could have been
ducked by Marshall's saying (as, to one's great vexation, the Supreme Court occa-
sionally does today) that the constitutional questions need not be answered as not
being directly presented or as involving political questions. Well it is for this
country that Marshall leaped to decide these constitutional questions when he did
and in the way he did. And we can rejoice that he did not employ any of the
modern techniques by which today a constitutional decision is frequently evaded.39
A third decision of Marshall must be mentioned, Gibbons v. Ogden. That
case determined the scope of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. It gives
the Congress the power:
To regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.
The case involved the right of New York to give a monopoly to Fulton to operate
steam boats on the rivers of New York. The trip involved was one from Elizabeth,
New Jersey to Albany, New York. Gibbons had a federal license to operate his
boats in the coastal trade, so the question was directly presented as to which law,
state or federal, was supreme.
It was then 1824. Marshall had been on the bench for twenty-three years, and
not one Federalist remained there with him. To carry his court and write the
opinion Marshall had to make some concessions, and this explains why the opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden is in parts fuzzy and confusing. From prior opinions we
know Marshall believed that the Commerce Clause empowered the Congress to
regulate intrastate4 ' or domestic commerce. Probably to carry his court, Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden had to say that the Commerce Clause did not apply to commerce
that "is completely internal". But he adds at once that it does not apply to
Commerce,
which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different
parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.
When we analyze closely what Marshall says in Gibbons v. Ogden, we see that he
asserts for the Congress the power to regulate domestic or intrastate commerce.
39 The "ducking" rules are infinite. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923);
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). The author of the
fallacious principle that no constitutional point should be faced by the Supreme Court until
the pistol is at its head, neglected to practice what he preached in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Keeffe, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949). As Roscoe
Pound has pointed out, procedural rules of this type are a source of the greatest danger. See
also Keeffe, Brooks and Greer, 86 or 1100, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 253 (1946), and Keeffe, A
National Ministry of justice, 40 A.B.A.J. 951 (1954).
4o Note that the Constitution does not use the word "interstate". It says "commerce".
And it does not say "Commerce between the States". It says "commerce among the several
States".
How can there be any internal commerce in any state of any kind that "does not
extend to or affect other States"? This was the interpretation of Gibbons v. Ogden
when it was decided. New York, in a second steamboat case, declared that Congress
could regulate intra-state commerce.41 The case concerned a boat plying between
Albany, New York and New York City, so that unlike Gibbons v. Ogden an intra-
state trip was before the court.42
As soon as Marshall died in 1835 and Taney came to the Court, the states
rights advocates took over. Then was born the alleged distinction between intra
and interstate commerce. From then until that famous chicken was killed in Brook-
lyn and the NRA and the blue eagle of Iron Pants Johnson died with it, laws of
the Congress were declared unconstitutional from time to time as regulating intra-
state commerce."' In our day we have lived to see Gibbons v. Ogden rise from the
grave to become law again.
In the Laughlin Steel case,44 and in many others, we have been told that any
intra-state commerce that affects interstate commerce can be regulated by the
Congress. Marshall's double-talk in Gibbons v. Ogden has once again become the
law of the land. Even prize fights and theatrical exhibitions can be regulated. For
some strange reason only major-league baseball remains intra-state commerce.
Once in a while there is some other flash-back, but by and large the distinction
between inter and intra-state commerce has been obliterated."5
We all remember the anxious days of the thirties when Roosevelt was press-
ing his court-packing bill and the Court was under attack by him, even as it had
been by Jefferson in the early eighteen hundreds or as it is today by the South. It
was indeed paradoxical that Roosevelt, the great admirer of Jefferson, should win
his nationalistic victory for the new-deal laws that today regulate American busi-




41 The North River Steam Boat Company v. John R. Livingston, 3 Cow. 711 (N.Y.
1825.)
42 Crosskey devotes Parts 1 and 2 of Volume I of his work to the Commerce Clause.
43 It was not until after Marshall's death that his great decision in the Gibbons case
was repudiated by his Court.
44See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Today all"commerce" except baseball seems to be subject to regulation by the federal government.
454 BEVERMGE, op. cit. supra note 8 at 397-460.
46 See notes 26 and 44. Cf. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 42, 43, 82, 151 (1956). It is surprising to observe Powell saying, "Taney's
mind seems to me markedly neater than that of Marshall, and his arguments are less open to
refutation. Marshall was more intriciate, more philosophical, cleverer at turning sharp
There are decisions of Marshall which this writer laments. Barron v. Baltimore
is without a doubt his worst mistake, holding as it did that the Bill of Rights
applies only to the national government and not to the states.4" Probably Marshall's
name played its part in the destruction of the Privileges and Immunities clause of
the 14th Amendment by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House cases.48 But
Strawbridge v. Curtis appears equally mistaken, holding as it does that an action
cannot be one between citizens of different states if there happens to be just one
party defendant of the same citizenship as one party plaintiff. Practically this has
led to hours of unnecessary litigation and endangered every suit in a federal court
based on diversity where more than two parties are involved. 4 Probably Marshall's
decision in Hepburn5" can be partly blamed for the low state of civil liberty
possessed by those poor people condemned to live in the District of Columbia.
But we would have to be very provincial indeed not to recognize that the
great soldier, lawyer and statesman who decided Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch
v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden made this country a nation, and that his judi-
cial errors elsewhere, if any, are trivial in comparison. Professor Beveridge may
believe if he wishes that Marshall was a "Supreme Conservative", 1 but one must
remember that Beveridge was writing about Marshall as an old man52 when he used
that label. It was Marshall as a young man and a Federalist who voted in Congress
against the Alien and Seditions laws,5" and who testified so honestly on the
impeachment trial of Mr. Justice Samuel Chase of the United States Supreme
Court,14 and who braved Jefferson's wrath to do justice to Aaron Burr. 5
corners, and his elocution is more sonorous than Taney's . . gifts which doubtless are
literary virtues but not necessarily judicial ones. Marshall was a nation builder, which Taney
was not. As a creative statesman Marshall built superstructures on the foundation laid by
the Fathers, but Taney in my view kept loser to that foundation than did Marshall, with
always the tragic exception of his Dred Scott enormity, as to the absence of national power
to forbid slavery in the territories." See POWELL at Page 43.
477 Pet. 243 (1833).
48 For a brilliant attack on the soundness of this decision, see 2 CROSSKEY op. cit. supra
note 32, at 1083-1158. For the case itself, see 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
493 Cranch 267 (1806). See Keffe and Cotter, Service of Process in Suits Against
Directors: A Barrier to Justice, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 74 (1941), and Keeffe, 29 Distinct Dam-
nations of the Federal Practice and a National Ministry of Justice, 7 VAND. L. REV. 636,
654-655 (1954).
5°See Keeffe and Dykes, The 1940 Amendment To The Diversity Of Citizenship
Clause, 21 TUL. L. REV. 171 (1946), and Rathvon, Jr. and Keeffe, Washingtonians and
Roumanians, 27 NEB. L. REV 375 (1948). See also National Mutual Insurance Company
v. Tidewater Transfer Company, 337 U. S. 582 (1948), and see Note, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 198
(1949). The Hepburn case is Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805).
514 BEVERIDGE, op. cit supra note 8 at 461-517.
52 Id. at 67.
532 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, 432-484 (1919).
543 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 31 at 157-222.
5 Id. at 274-342, 343-397. Recently Mr. Justice Burton has reviewed the trial of Burr
and reached the same conlusions as Beveridge. Mr. Justice Burton, Justice The Guardian of
Liberty; John Marshall at the Trial of Aaron Burr, 37 A.B.A.J. 735 (1951). If one half
of what either Beveridge or Burton say is true (and I assume all they say is true), then the
greatest blow that Jefferson ever struck against civil liberty was the unjustfied trial of
Aaron Burr.
Believing stubbornly as I do in the presumption of innocence, I am convinced
that John Marshall, either in the morning or the evening of his days, would have
risen to his country's needs in our thirties and would have voted with Charles
Evans Hughes and Owen Roberts in the Laughlin Steel case. To me, Marshall was
first and last a magnificent Mugwump.
